ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his study examines analyst reactions to management disclosures depending on firm characteristics. Prior studies have shown that analysts have an incentive to issue accurate earnings forecasts (Lim, 2001; Hong and Kubik, 2003) and an incentive to maintain a positive relationship with the firms that they follow (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998) . The analyst reaction to management disclosure can be influenced by either of these two incentives. In this manner, Cotter et al. (2006) find that analysts quickly react to management disclosures and are more likely to issue final meetable or beatable earnings targets when management provides public disclosure. Following these studies, analyst reaction to management disclosures has been viewed from differing perspectives. Tan et al. (2010) show that the analyst forecasts reflect management disclosures to a greater extent if the prior management disclosure is accurate. This is because management disclosure that is historically accurate can convince analysts that current management disclosure is more credible than at times of inaccuracy. This study implies that analysts consider manager reputation in their forecasts immediately following the announcement of management disclosures. Additionally, Feng and McVay (2010) provide evidence that analysts consider the disclosures of firms that subsequently announce an equity offering to be more credible because the equity offering provides an incentive to please the firm (ex., underwriter selection). They find specific situations where analysts react differently to management disclosures. These efforts are valuable because they identify certain factors or situations that cause analysts to react differently to management disclosures. However, they examine single characteristics of management disclosures or managers' disclosure pattern individually and did not adopt a whole firm perspective. Therefore, I examine whether the analysts consider the firm characteristics when they reflect management disclosure in their revisions.
To examine the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosures, I use two types of firm characteristics, accounting conservatism and corporate governance. First, with respect to accounting conservatism, I
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, analyst behavior is important because analysts play a crucial role as information providers for financial markets. An examination of analyst behavior reveals the effectiveness of the analyst role and whether the information provided sufficiently reflects the factors that can affect the information's credibility or usefulness. Second, this paper provides evidence that analysts consider and reflect whole firm characteristics in their revised earnings forecasts. This study finds that analysts react differently to management disclosures depending on the firm characteristics such as accounting conservatism, managerial ownership, and corporate governance, in addition to specific situations or management forecast characteristics. The evidence demonstrates that analysts consider management disclosure from a whole firm perspective when they react to the disclosures. Third, with respect to conservatism, a prior study finds that analyst earnings forecasts do not fully impound the implications of accounting conservatism (Pae and Thornton, 2010) . However, I provide evidence that analysts understand accounting conservatism and that they consider a firm's conservatism level in their revision of earnings forecasts to some degree. Fourth, the level of detail effect reveals that analysts react to management disclosure depending on the type of news (good news or bad news) and that different types of news are considered differently depending on firm characteristics, especially accounting conservatism, as a result of the nature of conservatism. For conservative firms, good news is indicative of really good news, whereas, for a less conservative firm, good news is not considered to be a positive indicator to the same extent. Depending on the conservatism level of the firm, not all good news is equally good, and not all bad news is equally bad. considered credible and useful, then analysts credit these disclosures with more weight when revising earnings forecasts. Analysts consider management forecast characteristics, such as credibility and usefulness, when they revise earnings forecasts. Certain prior studies provide evidence that analyst reaction is different depending on the credibility of management forecasts using proxies for the credibility of management forecasts. Hassell et al. (1988 ), Williams (1996 , and Cotter et al. (2006) suggest that if management disclosure is downward disclosure (i.e., bad news), then it is more credible. Managers possess an incentive to overstate current earnings and expectations for future cash flows to reflect efficient management and to maximize their compensation. Therefore, downward disclosure appears more credible because of this management-associated characteristic. Additionally, these studies find that analysts react greater to bad news disclosure. Tan et al. (2010) provide evidence to demonstrate that analysts react greater to management disclosure, if the prior management disclosure accuracy has been high, because the history of prior disclosure accuracy can cause analysts to think that management forecasting of a current period is also credible.
Other papers examine different analyst reactions to management forecasts depending on the usefulness of the forecasts. Baginski et al. (1993) document that the more precise the management disclosure, the more useful it is. Feng and McVay (2010) find that analysts react significantly to precise disclosures and suggest that early disclosure is more useful to analysts because analysts have limited information concerning the earnings of newly established firms, and the management forecasts in this case contain useful information for analysts. They empirically find that analysts credit early management forecasts with significant weight.
The prior literature suggests that analyst reaction to management forecasts differs according to management forecast characteristics. However, these prior studies consider each particular basic characteristic of management forecasting itself using proxies, such as good news and bad news, and not from the whole firm perspective. Can firm characteristics affect management forecast characteristics? If firm characteristics can affect management disclosure characteristics (credibility and usefulness), it may be assumed that firm characteristics may also have an effect on analyst reaction. Analysts have an incentive to react differently depending on the firm characteristics because of the effect of firm characteristics on management forecast credibility or usefulness. Therefore, I investigate the possibility that firm characteristics have an influence on analyst reaction to management disclosure in this study.
Certain firm characteristics can affect management forecasting credibility and usefulness. First, I examine the conservatism level of the firm. A firm's level of conservatism affects the management forecast characteristics. Conservatism forces earlier recognition of bad news that managers have an incentive to delay. Chen et al. (2007) argue that conservatism can reduce upward earnings management by recognizing earnings conservatively. LaFond and Watts (2008) document that conservatism reduces information asymmetry by increasing the speed with which negative information is revealed in the earnings. Management has an incentive, therefore, to overstate accounting earnings; thus, conservatism can render a firm's financial results credible. Analysts can also perceive earnings announcement from conservative firms to be more informative and more credible, like investors (Kim and Pevzner, 2010) . These prior studies focus on the role of conservatism with respect to manager earnings announcements. In the case of voluntary management disclosures, it is also true that management forecasts of more conservative firms are less optimistic and more informative. Therefore, I suggest that the management forecasts of conservative firms are more credible and useful and that analysts react more significantly to the management forecasts that are announced by such conservative firms. Therefore, I present Hypothesis 1. For convenience, I term the coefficient that indicates analyst response to management earnings forecasts the analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts.
Hypothesis 1:
The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater for firms with a higher level of conservatism.
I also examine the effects of accounting conservatism on analyst reaction by dividing management forecasts into two groups, good news forecasts and bad news forecasts, because conservatism can affect good news and bad news forecasts differently. When a good news management forecast is announced with respect to a less conservative firm, analysts can perceive this disclosure as less credible because this good news disclosure of a less conservative firm is optimistically biased. However, with respect to a conservative firm, good news disclosure is perceived to be more credible by analysts because good news by a conservative firm is relatively less biased as a result of conservative accounting tendency. Conversely, bad news disclosure by a less conservative firm can be perceived as more credible A firm's governance structure is another firm characteristic that affects management forecast characteristics. The board of directors is the main corporate governance mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of directors should monitor a firm's management to mitigate the agency conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and control. The board of directors can effectively monitor managers when the directors are independent. Board independence is an indicator of strong governance. How does strong governance, such as an independent board, affect management forecast characteristics? Managers in firms with strong governance are monitored by the governance mechanism, and an independent board monitors the financial reporting process. Beasley (1996) find that a larger proportion of external board directors prevents financial statement fraud because external directors monitor the preparation of financial statements more effectively. Klein (2002) also find that independent boards are more effective in monitoring the financial accounting process and that independent boards prevent earnings management by managers. Additionally, Sengupta (2004) documents that firms with independent boards are likely to announce quarterly earnings earlier. Thus, a firm that possesses an independent board of directors releases useful and credible management forecasts because board pressure is more aligned with the interests of shareholders. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with external directors are more likely to issue a forecast and that these forecasts tend to be more specific and accurate. These prior studies imply that independent directors cause managers to issue credible and useful forecasts and analyst reaction to these management forecasts is also affected by this firm characteristic. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater for firms with a higher level of board independence.
Managerial ownership is another firm characteristic that can also affect management forecast characteristics. Managers are agents that represent shareholders and often experience conflict between their private benefits and those of shareholders. Managers with sufficient ownership often pursue their own wealth to the detriment of shareholder benefits. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) model this problem and show that manager ability to conduct relationshipspecific investments and contracts can cause their replacement to be difficult, which permits them to extract greater wealth. Managers may, therefore, entrench themselves and pursue their own wealth. Morck et al. (1988) document that if managerial ownership is minimal, manager interest might align with external shareholder interest; however, higher levels of managerial ownership can result in greater manager entrenchment and increasing agency costs. From this entrenchment perspective, managers with a higher level of ownership who endeavor to maximize private benefits opportunistically can withhold or manipulate the information released to external investors or analysts (Baik and Yi, 2007 ). Managers with a higher level of ownership are likely to disclose information that is beneficial to their own interests or to time the release of information opportunistically. Entrenched managers with a higher level of ownership may use management forecasts for their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. Thus, managers with a higher level of ownership may issue less credible and less useful management forecasts because of their opportunistic behavior with respect to management disclosure. Analysts are also not likely to reflect the management forecasts from managers with a higher level of ownership. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
The data for the sample were extracted from the First Call database, which provides management disclosure, analyst forecasting, and actual earnings data, for the period 1995 to 2009.
1 To measure the level of conservatism, I use the Compustat Annual and CRSP database. I also use CEO and top manager ownership data from the ExecuComp (in Compustat) database, corporate governance data from the Risk Metrics database, and quarterly financial statement data from the Compustat Quarterly database. The total management forecasts observations for this period is 57,848. I first exclude non-EPS forecasts, non-USD currency forecasts, and qualitative forecasts to measure management disclosure levels and analyst revision levels. Figure 1 illustrates that I also exclude forecasts issued before the date of the earnings announcement of the prior quarter and forecasts issued after the date of the earnings announcement of the current quarter to examine the pure effect of management forecasts on analyst forecast revisions. To calculate management disclosure levels, I exclude observations without preexisting analyst forecasts. For levels of conservatism, ownership, director, and other variables, I exclude observations for which these variables cannot be calculated. After all variables are accounted for, the final sample for empirical analysis is composed of 6,655 observations.
2 The detailed procedure of sample selection is reported in Table 1 . 
Research Design and Variable Definitions

The Empirical Model
To investigate the reaction of analysts to management disclosure in the revision of earnings forecasts, I estimate the following regression model depending on firm characteristics:
I follow the model used in Feng and McVay (2010) that investigates analyst reaction to management disclosure when revising their forecasts. This current study investigates analyst reaction to management disclosure and the differences depending on firm characteristics. Thus, the research design requires measuring the levels of public disclosure from managers and the subsequent analyst forecast revisions to earnings forecasts. Consistent with Feng and McVay (2010) , I first measure the disclosure level of management forecasts (GUIDE) as the difference between the manager earnings forecast and the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. The preexisting consensus analyst forecast is the last revised consensus within 30 days prior to the management disclosure. To measure the analyst reaction level, I set REACT as the revised consensus of analyst forecasts minus the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. The revised consensus is the last revised consensus available within the 15 days following the management disclosure, and, if there is no revision, the preexisting forecast is used as the revised consensus (i.e., reaction is zero). This measure identifies the extent to which the analyst forecasts are revised after the management disclosure is released.
This model investigates the association between management disclosure and analyst reaction. Analysts generally reflect management disclosure when they revise their forecasts; thus, β 1 is expected to be positive. Using proxies for firm characteristics and controls, I calculate the interaction variables with GUIDE because my focus is on whether firm characteristics have an effect on the relationship between management disclosure and the level of analyst forecast revision. The control variables are factors that might affect the relationship between management disclosure levels and the reaction level of analysts. I use all firm characteristics variables at the fiscal year end of the year t-1 because firm characteristics of year t cannot be identified by analysts at the moment that they revise their earnings forecast in reaction to management disclosure in the year t.
The Proxies for Firm Characteristics
This study investigates the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosure. First, the independent variable FIRM_char uses five measures including accounting conservatism (CON), ownership measures (CEO_OWN, TOP_OWN), and board independence measures (B_INDEP, AC_INDEP). With respect to the measures for conservatism, I apply three types of individual measures (one representing conditional conservatism and two representing unconditional conservatism) and two types of aggregate measures representing the validity and the credibility of the proxies.
The first measure of conservatism is CSCORE, following Khan and Watts (2009) . Specifically, it is calculated by the following annual, cross-sectional regression model:
From this regression model, the result is µ j,t and λ j,t (j = 1 -4) and, using these, I can calculate the incremental timeliness of bad news each year.
The second measure of conservatism is CONACC, based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) . This measure is derived from the concept that conservative accounting generates consistently negative accruals by accelerating bad news and decelerating good news. To compute this measure, I first calculate the values of total accruals (income before extraordinary items -cash flows from operations + depreciation expense) deflated by average total assets. I then take the mean over three years, centered on year t. By averaging the values, I can reduce the possible temporary effects on accruals because these transient effects are likely to disappear within two years (Richardson et al., 2005) . I then multiply by negative one (-1) so that a larger value of the measure implies a greater level of conservatism.
The third measure of conservatism is CONBM. Generally, conservative firms tend to understate the book value of equity compared to the market value of equity. For this reason, conservative firms will have a lower book-to-market ratio. I calculate CONBM as the book-to-market ratio multiplied by negative one (-1) because a higher value for the measure should indicate a higher level of conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2000) .
The other two measures of conservatism are CONAGG1 and CONAGG2. Following the concept used in Hui et al. (2009) , I develop two aggregate measures because each of the three measures above contains some errors in gauging the level of conservatism. First, I calculate the rank of each firm's conservatism level based on CSCORE, CONACC, and CONBM. CONAGG1 is the average value of these three ranks regardless of whether the measures indicate conditional or unconditional conservatism, and CONAGG2 is the average value of two ranks of unconditional conservatism measures (i.e., CONACC and CONBM). I adopt the mean of the rank values because the mean of the raw values might be biased by a dominant or extreme value. However, this method using the rank values may mitigate these possible biases.
I examine board independence as a corporate governance mechanism. I use B_INDEP as a proxy for board independence, which is defined as the percentage of independent directors that belong to the full board of directors. This study uses two measures with respect to ownership, CEO_OWN and TOP_OWN. CEO_OWN represents the percentage of total shares held by the CEO to total outstanding shares, and TOP_OWN is the percentage of total shares held by the top five executives to total outstanding shares. This study uses CEO and top manager ownership measures as a firm characteristic because CEO or top manager-related factors can become an area of focus for analysts reacting to management disclosure. The Clute Institute
Other Control Variables
With respect to control variables, I first use two proxies for credibility that have already been used in prior literature, DOWN and REPUTATION. These proxies can directly affect the credibility of management forecasts. DOWN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager's disclosure is a downward disclosure (i.e., the management forecast is lower than the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts) (e.g., Hassell et al. 1988; Cotter et al. 2006) . Because managers possess an incentive to overstate the current financial situation to imply superior management and to maximize compensation, management disclosure may appear credible if it is a downward disclosure. REPUTATION is the average accuracy of management disclosure for the prior three years, where the accuracy is equal to 1, 0, and -1 if the absolute value of the management forecast error is less than, equal to, and greater than the preexisting analyst forecast error, respectively. Therefore, REPUTATION is higher when the historical reputation of the management is superior. If historical reputation is superior in terms of management forecasting, then the likelihood that the current management forecast is accurate is also considered to be high (Tan et al., 2010) .
I also control for factors that can affect the usefulness of management disclosure, HORIZON and RANGE. HORIZON is the log of the number of days between the release date of management disclosure and the earnings announcement. If the number of days is low, limited information is available in the market, and the usefulness of management disclosure is high if HORIZON is high. RANGE measures the management disclosure precision by calculating the range of the forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter for a range forecast and 0 for a point forecast. If the management disclosure range is higher, the usefulness of the disclosure is lower. Additionally, I use ANALYSTS as a control variable for the log of the number of analysts following a firm because I use the measures based on the consensus analyst forecast. (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) . With respect to ownership, CEO has, on average, approximately 1.73% and the top five managers have approximately 2.68% of total shares outstanding. For the DOWN variable, the mean value is 0.4972; this implies that the downward disclosure relative to the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts is approximately 50% percent of the total management disclosure contained in the sample.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The correlation coefficients for the independent and the dependent variables are untabulated. In the untabulated results, I find that the correlation between REACT and GUIDE is significantly positive. The majority of the correlations between conservatism measures and REACT are positive and significant with the exception of CSCORE and REACT. The ownership variables are negatively correlated with REACT (-0.028, -0.020), and the board independence variables are positively correlated with the analyst reaction variable (0.016, 0.000). 
Results for Conservatism
The Results for the Tests of Hypothesis 1 Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1) for each five measures of conservatism. I hypothesize that the ARC for management forecasts is positive for those firms that exhibit higher levels of conservatism. To be consistent with Hypothesis 1, β 2 should be positive; however, the results show that the coefficient of the interaction variable GUIDE*CON is significantly negative across all five measures of conservatism. The result implies that analyst reaction is greater in response to management forecasts from firms with lower levels of conservatism, which is contrary to my prediction. I defer the explanation of these results to the next subsample analysis section. The coefficients of the GUIDE*DOWN and GUIDE*REPUTATION variables are significantly positive for all measures of conservatism. This implies that analyst reaction is greater in response to downward management forecasts and to the management forecasts from firms with a higher level of historical management forecast accuracy, which is consistent with my prediction and those of prior studies. Additionally, I find that analysts lend more weight to the disclosure when the range of management disclosure is greater and more analysts follow the firm. The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts -preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The Results for the Tests of Hypotheses 2a and 2b
To perform further analyses, I divide the sample into two groups according to whether the management forecasts are downward or upward disclosures. The results of the tests using these subsamples are presented in Table 4 . Using the good news disclosure sample and five conservatism measures that I used in the full sample analysis shown in panel A, the results for the majority of the conservatism measures are that analyst reactions are significantly and positively associated with levels of conservatism. This implies that analyst reaction is greater in response to good news from firms with a higher level of conservatism, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2a. Similarly, the results in panel B support Hypothesis 2b and show negative coefficients of GUIDE*CON across all measures of conservatism. Therefore, according to the type of management disclosure, conservatism affects analyst reaction. The results of the full sample may be found by summing up these two opposite effects of conservatism. However, the effects of downward disclosures are dominant because analysts lend more credibility to downward disclosures (e.g., Williams, 1996) . Thus, the full sample results can be explained by the dominant effects of conservatism on downward management disclosures. The coefficients of the control variables are similar to the full sample analysis results with the exception of the significance level. The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts -preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Results for Corporate Governance
The results for corporate governance are presented in Table 5 . The first column shows the result for the board independence variable, and the last two columns present the results for the ownership variables. In the first column, consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find a significantly positive relationship between the analyst reaction to management disclosure and board independence at the 1% significance level. I conclude that analysts lend more credibility to management disclosures that are announced by firms with a higher level of board independence in the revising of earnings forecasts. Similarly, I find that a firm's managerial ownership is significant (at the 1% level) and negatively related to analyst reaction following management disclosures, which is presented in the second and third columns of Table 5 . These results support that analysts lend credibility to disclosures when firm managers have a lower level of ownership, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Other variables are similar to those reported in previous tables. The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts -preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
ADDITIONAL TESTS Alternative Measures for Corporate Governance
To test for the effects of corporate governance on analyst reaction to management disclosure, I use a board independence measure and two managerial ownership measures. To check for robustness, I re-examine the corporate governance tests using alternative governance measures, INST_OWN and CEO_CHAIR_SEP. The measure INST_OWN represents institutional ownership measured as a percentage of total shares that are held by institutions to total outstanding shares. The measure CEO_CHAIR_SEP indicates whether the CEO of the firm is also the chair of the board, and it is measured as 1 if the CEO is not the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. The results for the tests of the effects of corporate governance using these two alternative measures are documented in Table 6 . The results show that the greater the institutional ownership, the greater the impact on analyst reaction to management disclosures because the shareholders possess a powerful monitoring role. The results also show that if the CEO of the firm is not the chair of the board, then analyst reaction is greater in response to management disclosures issued from the firm. This is because if the CEO of the firm also has a role as chair of the board, then the board member monitoring activities will be restricted by the CEO. These results further confirm my predictions concerning corporate governance. The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts -preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The Endogeneity Issue
I use the conservatism measures as independent variables to examine the effects of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosures. However, it is likely that the level of conservatism can be endogenously decided. Thus, I repeat the tests of conservatism using a two-stage least squares regression method. I use the firm characteristic variables that can affect the level of conservatism as instrument variables according to prior literature (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) . In Table 7 , Panel A reports the results of the second stage regression of two-stage least squares regression using the good news disclosure sample, and Panel B shows the results using the bad news disclosure sample. With the exception of certain models, the results are similar to those reported in Table 4 , which support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts -preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Instrument variables: SIZE, DEBT, CFO, CSALES, LITI, and BIG4 Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reactions to management disclosures. Unlike prior studies, I focus on the firm characteristics rather than general management forecast characteristics or analyst-specific characteristics. Using various conservatism measures, I find that analyst reaction is greater in response to good news management disclosures from firms with a higher level of conservatism and bad news management disclosures from firms with a lower level of conservatism. This finding demonstrates that care should be taken in explaining the effect of conservatism on analyst reaction to management disclosures because the effect is different depending on the type of management disclosure using both full sample and subsample analysis. I also find that analyst reaction is greater in response to management disclosures from firms with a higher level of board independence or a lower level of managerial ownership. This implies that the corporate governance structure is a consideration of analysts in the revision of their forecasts following management disclosures. All of the results hold after controlling for general management forecast characteristics or other general variables that are likely to affect analyst reaction to management disclosures. I provide evidence that firm characteristics are considered by analysts when they reflect the management disclosures in their revisions. Therefore, my findings are consistent with the fact that analysts are interested in certain firm characteristics as a method to estimate the credibility or usefulness of management disclosures. This study extends the literature concerning financial analysts; however, it also has limitations. Future study is required to examine other effects that this study does not address, such as the effects of market reaction to management disclosure on the analyst reactions to this management disclosure. The Clute Institute
APPENDIX 1
The variable definitions
Variable name Definition
GUIDE
Management earnings forecast -the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter (where the preexisting consensus analyst forecast is the last revised consensus within 30 days prior to management disclosure).
REACT
Revised consensus of analyst forecasts -the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter (where the revised consensus is the last revised consensus available in the 15 days following the management disclosure, and if there is no revision, the preexisting forecast is used as the revised consensus) CSCORE Conservatism measure in Khan and Watts (2009) . Detailed procedures are explained in Section 3.2.2.
CONACC Conservatism measure using accruals from Givoly and Hayn (2000) , calculated by (income before extraordinary items -cash flows from operations + depreciation expense) divided by average total assets. CONBM Conservatism measure from Beaver and Ryan (2000) , calculated by book-to-market ratio multiplied by negative one (-1).
CONAGG1
Average rank of CSCORE, CONACC, and CONBM. CONAGG2
Average rank of CONACC and CONBM.
CEO_OWN
The percentage of total shares held by the CEO to total outstanding shares.
TOP_OWN
The percentage of total shares held by the top-five executives to total outstanding shares.
B_INDEP
The percentage of directors that are independent in the board of directors.
AC_INDEP
The percentage of directors that are independent in the audit committee.
DOWN
Equal to 1 if the manager's disclosure is below the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts and 0 otherwise.
REPUTATION
The mean value of management disclosure accuracy over three years centered on year t, where the accuracy is equal to 1, 0, and -1 if the absolute value of the management forecast error is less than, equal to, and greater than the preexisting analyst forecast error.
HORIZON
The log of the number of days between the release of a management forecast and the actual earnings announcement.
RANGE
The range of the management forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter for a range forecast, and 0 for a point forecast.
ANALYSTS
The log of the total number of analyst forecasts used in consensus following a management forecast.
